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The rapidly changing nature of the global society and the growth of scientific and technological innovation has brought the recognition of a world that is increasingly ‘in the making’ (Haraway, 1991). Scientific and technological developments have touched all realms of life from the micro to the macro levels, transforming natural resources for social and economic development at an unprecedented rate. Creative thinking, inherently embedded in scientific thinking, has led to many innovations to fulfil human needs and desires.
The vision of a future in the hands of science and technology however is accompanied by mounting risks and uncertainties over the course of life on Earth. Sudden, large scale and long-lasting shifts have been observed in the structure and function of ecological and economic systems alike, as a result of human action (Norström et al. 2009; Biggs et al. 2010, Crépin 2007). When such shifts occur, the system changes configuration; it takes unpredictable trajectories with unknown impacts. As pointed out by Westley et al. (2011) the magnitude and scale of current changes is overstepping the ability of human beings to define and control the impacts. The authors ask: “can we innovate sufficiently rapidly and with sufficient intelligence to transform our system out of a destructive pathway and into one that leads to social and ecological resilience?” (p.762). 
Such question poses important challenges to current scientific practices but also to societal and educational institutions, with their embedded values and behaviours. At a time when humans have been recognised as one of the single most pervasive agents of evolutionary change, what is the role of education and schools? Creative thinking is the ability to bring forth new ideas and new artefacts stemming from higher order cognitive functions including perception, emotion, memory, language, decision-making (Damasio, 2001). As reported by Humes (2011) it is almost undoubted that the proposal of creativity in education is one of those concepts with which one could hardly disagree with. Creativity is associated with a positive, ‘can do’ approach and it is promoted as a desirable attribute both for education in the early years and for enhancing opportunities for employment. Yet there are many questions still to be answered regarding the aims and purposes of school science education beyond the discourse of economic opportunities. Many authors from the diverse fields of educational theory, educational policy, anthropology, future studies have been asking hard questions about the role of education at a time of change: “Are schools relevant to the complex realities of a changing planet”? (Greenwood, year, p. 279). What agendas are being served? What is the future that we desire for all? (Montuori, 2012). How does creativity in science align with a sustainability view? 
This paper begins from an inquiry into the nature of scientific and technological innovation in current times. It is suggested that innovation is conceived both in terms of products and process, and cannot be disjointed from its cultural narratives about the future, and views of humanity and nature. From this perspective, an interrogation of creativity in science requires a reflection on the presuppositions guiding scientific inquiry and its values and purposes. In education, creative thinking skills can be harnessed to develop the ability to destabilise existing ways of thinking, and propose new, counter-narratives. An educational context stimulating creativity in learning and teaching is proposed as means to raise awareness of the multiple ways in which we come to know and to act with people and places at all levels. 
At the roots of scientific and technological innovation in the 21st century: Big Science and global ecosystems change.   
In the era of climate change, economic downturns and political unrest, the world is facing a peak in the rate of urbanization, demand for energy resources and population growth. This is also the scenario which celebrates an ever expanding enterprise of scientific and technological innovation. Innovation is a word synonymous with new ideas, products and artefacts. Innovation is also associated with changes of values and culturally accepted norms, thus bringing a sense of emancipation from what is considered to be the old, the known and the past. The word ‘to innovate’ brings a certain element of expectation for something better to come, along with the surprise and risk deriving from new choices. 
It has become almost customary nowadays to associate science and technology with innovation, bringing ideas of change and improvement in our general everyday life pursuits. As we make our ways home after work, in a busy city road, a fuel pump in the nearby Tesco garage struck our attention with the sign “we fuel progress”. Innovative solutions for health, for nutrition, for the home, for travel are proposed on an everyday basis by the media, research foundations, supermarkets, insurance companies, paving the road of socio-economic development.  
Many of the products that are made available to the public however, from innovation in nano-technologies, to stem cells research or GM food production bring a dimension of risk and uncertainty with respect to the impact these can have on the health of individuals, society and the environment as a whole. It is thus the case that the advancements of innovation are subjected to ongoing debates in the scientific community and in society alike about the risks and the benefits they may bring (Savolainen, 2010). Questions about safety are being asked. And are we able to regulate? What are the expectations behind such innovations? Who benefits? Who makes decisions?
In order to try and answer such questions an understanding of the dramatic change in the nature of science and technological innovation which has occurred over the past fifty years or so, and how this has affected their relationship with society. 
The type of science we recognise on an everyday basis as being associated with technical and economic innovation is quite different from the image of the disinterested scientist engaging in the pursuit of knowledge. The scientific and technological applications which populate our choices and actions in everyday life are part of a larger domain of confluence of political, financial and information powers which around the second part of the 21st century came to be known as Big Science, bringing innovation for military defence and global business (Forman, 1987). As part of the Big Science initiatives we can count the Manhattan project, in which large teams of scientists cooperated with funding from a consortium of U.S. and UK governments to develop the first atomic bomb during World War 1, and many other projects. More recently, we can include the development and adoption of drones used in the Israeli attacks on Gaza (the Guardian, 2014). In an article published in Science in 1961, Alvin Weinberg, who was at the time the director of the Oak ridge National Laboratory, compared the large-scale enterprise of science in the 20th century to the wonders of earlier civilizations:
“When history looks at the 20th century, she will see science and technology as its theme; she will find the monuments of Big Science – the huge rockets, the high energy accelerators, the high flux research reactors – symbols of our time just as surely as she finds in Notre Dame a symbol of the Middle Ages…” (Weinberg, p. 162). 
The 'big science' set out a crucial departure from the existing ways to understand and to produce scientific knowledge. The concentration of people and resources (financial and technical) which are available in large research laboratories, along with a growing interest in the economic impact of research have encouraged the development of an enterprise that operates at high power. Power in this sense derives from the concentration of mechanical and computational power of the machines deployed for large scale projects (e.g. the enormous superconducting particle accelerators with a circumference of many kilometres; the multiple sequencers used for the Human Genome Project); yet power is also derived from the centralization of economic and financial power, with newly established consortia of governments and private institutions supporting big science research. Centralization of economic resources is accompanied by a centralization of decision-making powers to support specific, large scale economic and military agendas. 
Scientists are increasingly dependent on the financial support provided by political and private institutions and they are accountable not only for the results but also for the economic and social impact of their research (Box 1). 

		Box 1: Big Science and Innovation: recent examples
Recently, the European Commission decided to fund two projects selected amongst 21 research submissions evaluated by a group of expert scientists and a Nobel Prize winner. The projects in question related to the mapping of the Human Brain and the development of Graphene, a light carbon-based material to be deployed in a range of technological applications (ICT, car manufacturing etc.). According to the comments provided by the European Unions officers (Reuters Agency, 28th January 2013) the choice looked at ‘ambitious’,’ visionary’ projects with the prospective of reaching maximum impact on society and the economy. A graphene week will take place in June 2015 in Manchester featuring exhibitions and hands-on workshops aimed to the public to “discover the wonders of graphene and how it can revolutionise society and our everyday lives” (http://www.sunderland.ac.uk/newsevents/news/news/index.php?nid=2810). 

Big Science constitutes the largest innovation of the century featuring important dimensions of creativity and had a key role in producing the world we live in today. We now turn to some of the key features of this creative process and the impacts this has had on the natural systems hosting human societies.   

Techno-science vis-à-vis the complexity of global, socio-environmental problems
Towards the end of the 20th century projects in physics and astronomy but also in life, agricultural and information sciences became big sciences affecting all realms of private and public life. While the common image of innovation may be associated with technological products, with big science projects a substantial change has occurred in the way human beings related to common aspects of the living world. From wild to domesticated species of animals and plants for example, under the influence of the Big Science agenda, the living world has become the prime object of scientific study and manipulation. An important example of such change can be found in the transition that occurred in agriculture from ‘traditional farming’ to ‘scientific farming’ (Box 2). 

Box 2 Traditional farming and scientific farming
Much has been written about scientific farming in the context of the Green Revolution, a term used to encompass large scale farming of monocultures of grains in developing countries (Shiva, 1991). Similarities can be drawn between the Green Revolution and intensive faring of animals: selected species of animals devoted to meat and milk production are grown in large numbers in artificially controlled environments. While traditional farming is often reliant upon rearing of mixed-breed in a composite economy mainly for local use, scientific farming is aimed at increasing productivity, maximising resources, and it depends upon regular and substantial massive inputs of chemical and mechanical energy (fertilisers; machineries etc) for global production and consumption. Currently, the Blue Revolution applies the same principles to the farming of selected species of fish and crustaceans in aquaculture ponds (Stokstad, 2010) to include the genetic modifications of salmon species for fish farming purposes (Smith et al., 2010). 
Drawing on the synthesis offered by Colucci-Gray et al. (2014), the knowledge deployed in techno-scientific interventions can be defined according to some generic, key features to include: narrow focus of inquiry (often confined to the scale and knowledge boundaries of a specific discipline); emphasis on the study of single units or parts linked by relationship of cause and effect; a preferential use of the quantitative language; use of modelling systems for prediction and control. Such features are commonly transferred, as illustrated in Box 2, across the different realms of innovation. 
Since the earlier Big Science developments, the accumulation of powers for transformation of natural resources has led to the formulation of the new term Techno-Science to refer to the combination of scientific knowledge, technological intervention and financial support at a larger scale. Science and technology have become the pillars of Western development with a number of important, epistemological, environmental and cultural implications, as described below. 

From description to direct application
The first level of change is epistemological. With Big Science projects a separation no longer exists between laboratory research and research in the open field: from the atomic bomb to the introduction of new fertilisers in the soil, trials and applications take place directly in the open territory, with the aim of producing deliberate global scale impacts, while often facing unexpected consequences. Within the framework of ‘bold innovation’, a clear and definite boundary no longer exists between ‘description’ and ‘transformation’ of the natural systems. Knowledge is produced by doing:  for example, by introducing a new fertiliser or a new chemical compound we can learn about the maximum productivity that can be obtained in any particular area and we can develop optimum solutions to increase the results. The outcome of this state of affairs can be summarised as living in a world ‘in the making’ whereby new scientific ideas develop in conjunction with their technological applications in the course of development projects. 
More importantly however, the operating conditions of Big Science are such that we cannot longer distinguish between ‘an original scientific idea’ from the social imagination which made it possible. Big Science trials are normally assessed for their productivity and effectiveness in achieving particular results. Hence the products of techno-science are all at the same time physical objects as well as symbols of a society and its ambitions. We will return later on the implications of this association between factual and metaphorical dimensions for developing creative thinking in science and in science education. 

From simplicity to complexity
Another important aspect to consider is the pervasive power of techno-scientific applications to interfere with the regulation of socio-ecological systems, by intercepting the global flows of minerals (e.g. Carbon); causing impacts on people and places which may be very distant from one another; and increasing the complexity of socio-ecological systems. Let’s think as an example about the effects of on-line shopping through portable digital interfaces. The click of a button leads to an exponential increase of the quantity of goods and resources that are mobilised everyday around the globe. Energy resources are channelled towards particular demands and activities; while in other parts of the globe mineral companies extract the precious minerals for mobile communication​[1]​ and the bitumen required for electric power generation. Conflicts are taking place over oil extraction or access to water resources​[2]​. Children in China, in India live everyday with the e-waste generated by Northern users and e-waste recycling is a major cottage industry in Guiyu with major health and environmental upsets (Worthy, 2013). 
As a result of the loss of a physical boundary between laboratories and testing environments, all people living on the planet are effectively relevant 'stakeholders' with an interest and a stake in matters of global relevance. Within the view of a global enterprise aimed at generating global impacts and revenues, the international scale of applications is a necessary requirement to enable to expand the scale of commerce and access and use of resources. According to some scholars however, this fact problematises existing ways in which decisions regarding research are made; for example, due to the complexity of system interactions, it is no longer sufficient to rely on simple indicators. Effects are often synergistic requiring interdisciplinary expertise. In addition, there is a great deal of disparity between the audience which is being served by new applications and the actors who are paying the consequences.   
The political, economic and financial powers the modern techno-science exerts its influence on civil society, through communication channels, both public and private. It follows that the imagery of big science is transmitted effectively to the public, capturing the imagination and fostering support from people (Wynne et al., 2003; Dahlstrom and Ho, 2012). Large flows of money are directed towards the funding of 'high power' research, sometimes summarized by the acronym GRAINN (Genomics, Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, Neuroscience and Nanotechnology). High power research is expected to positively improve the quality of life thanks to the production of durable, lighter materials, cleaner energy, production of clean water; they will also provide beneficial medical applications such as the ‘smart drugs’ (Maynard et al, 2006.)
Actions at the local level however are directly and simultaneously connected with effects at the global level in an intricate web of newly forming and existing interdependences. A new contradiction has emerged: in a situation in which the power of techno-science lures the political and economic sphere with the promise of unstoppable development and growth, society turns out to be the real ‘seducer’ (Baudrillard, 1979). Each one of us is both and at the same time, the subject and object of global transformation. Indeed the advocates of the seduction theory go even further to propose that the relationship between science and society is rooted in symbols and imaginations, which shape expectations, actions and behaviours about society and the future (Wynne, 1984). This has important implications for the relationships between science, policy and the public at large. Drawing on the earlier studies of Wynne on the IIASA energy study for example it was found that competing images of science existed and these affected the ways in which models were perceived and interpreted. The authors of the study concluded that scientific models are more symbolic vehicles for gaining authority than objective models framework. While this is to some extent acceptable and to be expected in a diverse society, it also means however that the internal processes (and not only the products) of modelling are a legitimate subject of public evaluation (Wynne, 1984, p. 277). So as reported by Ravetz (2003), now that growing recognition has been given to both the power and the limitations of science and technology to produce a desired good in terms of health, safety and well-being, the suggestion is that we go beyond “enlightenment rationality and instrumentalism, and to open up discussion of the messy processes of thinking, creating and imagining that we all engage in through everyday practice” (Ravetz, 2003, p. 64). Such recognition calls for a rethinking of the ways in which knowledge in science is produced and the ways in which it shapes our ability to act vis a vis the increasingly complex and uncertain future. 

Creative techno-science: from innovative solutions to ‘risks’
Many are wondering about our ability to govern this complexity. Some people are confident in the ability of human creative spirit, able to understand and control the natural systems, and to exploit them in our favor. Others are skeptical and seriously concerned. Martin Rees, famous and respected British scientist, in a recent article in the journal Science (2013) states that "we should be more concerned about events that have not yet happened but which, if they occurred even once, could cause worldwide devastation” (p. 6124). To cope with this situation, Rees points to the interdisciplinary research efforts of a group of social and scientist in Cambridge, UK who are currently involved in the launch of a research program aiming to identify the most plausible emerging risks and assess how to increase our resilience to account for them. 
These problematic circumstances were effectively described by Weinberg in the late seventies. The open-field, interventionist nature of techno-scientific innovation is by its very nature alienated from a specific disciplinary framing, setting or method of inquiry. In the open field, multiple modes of questioning, investigating and even collecting relevant data are bound to co-exist indefinitely within a context which is itself constantly changing. Such plurality of relevant but often incompatible ways of understanding problems determines a level of indeterminacy even in the definition of the matters at stake (Smith and Wynne, 1989).  
In an essay dedicated to the study of the politics of technological risk, Stirling (2008) distinguishes between four different conditions upon which decisions need to be made with regards to potential impacts of techno-scientific applications. Stirling (2008) distinguishes between a) Risk assessment; b) Ambiguity; c) Uncertainty; d) Ignorance. Each condition requires different methodological responses for different forms of incertitude. In conditions of risk, there is sufficient evidence to allow for calculations of potential outcomes and effects. However when the operating variables are multiple, calculations may lead to different, co-existing scenarios (ambiguities). At times the initial variables and conditions may be known but their interacting effects are unknown or unexpected. For example, we can cite the endocrine alterations that are emerging in animals and humans due to the use of chemicals intended to be deployed for local use in agriculture. Controversies are also emerging in relation to the role of the oceans in the accumulation or release of carbon in the atmosphere as a result of climatic changes in local areas (Manizza et al., 2013). These are examples of uncertainty derived from the impossibility to determine the course of interactions in complex systems. Finally, as indicated by Tallacchini (2005), lack of knowledge is defined as ignorance when not only the impacts are unknown but the variables cannot be unequivocally identified and defined. Ignorance is unavoidable when dealing with evolving systems in which the information space is open and expanding and observation changes in relation to the object being observed (Barad, 2007). 
In addition, the inherent complexity of the socio-ecological systems with multiple feed-back loops and emergent properties makes it impossible to derive an encompassing view over the issues at hand. Surprise is inevitable. 

Approaching the future: narratives of science in society 

There can be many possible responses, both individual and collective, towards complexity, uncertainty and more deeply, the unknown. Wynne et al (2007) refer to the use of operational, linguistic strategies in research adopted as a means for stabilising risk and communicate with the public about the ‘proper’ use of research. Such strategies are commonly referred to as ‘narratives’: narratives play an influential role in how individuals comprehend the world; arguably, they can represent the basic, default mode of human thought, laying the foundations for decision-making (Schank and Abelson, 1995), reasoning about possibilities and consequences and for visualising behaviour in complex situations. The recognition of the value of narratives in research is a relatively recent phenomenon. In the first instance, it requires the acknowledgement that language is not simply a tool for transferring data, facts or information. An extended discussion of narrative methods lies outside the scope of this paper but much has been written about what has often been referred as the ‘narrative turn’ in social sciences (see, e.g., Riessman, 2008). This has a set of salient features: a rejection of the idea of language as neutral and objective; an interest in analogies and metaphors in shaping perception by means of their symbolic power; a focus on the chronology of events influenced by the actions of specific characters; an interdisciplinary approach that draws on a mosaic of theoretical orientations. 
Narrative defined in this manner is often contrasted with other formats of communication and most notably with that of the evidence-based communication underlying the natural sciences. Evidence-based argumentation and narrative appear to dramatically diverge in the way they treat certainty, context and truth. Evidence-based argumentation seeks to communicate through clarity and truthfulness. It deals with the understanding of facts that can be extracted and abstracted from the specific context to provide objective and reliable readings of any situation. Modelling and theories derived from evidence can be used to infer about particular examples and to make predictions. In contrast, narrative thinking focuses on understanding people and their actions in a particular context and particular examples are used to infer about possibilities which maybe extended to a more general audience. What counts is the degree of verisimilitude of events and whether a narrative can be taken as possible and credible. These two types of communication have often been treated as belonging to very separate realms of social and personal endeavours: the evidence-based communication is often drawn upon as a type of expert communication, invoked by policy-makers in face of ‘difficult decisions’ on controversial, ambiguous problems. In contrast, narrative is associated with anecdotes, or lay stories, which may appeal to the public or may be used for entertainment or generic communication purposes. Narrative is associated with art; storytelling or poetry. It does not convince for its truth but persuades and appeal for the power of its metaphors and most notably, it is set in stark contrast with the truthful nature of science. 





Aims to predict and control	Aims to generate understanding
Focussed on physical and measurable causes and consequences	Focussed on human and institutional causes and consequences
Overlooks social and cultural meanings 	Highlights social and cultural meanings 
Emphasis on what is known 	Acceptance of uncertainty and ignorance
Tendency to emphasise ‘what works’	Has memory of what went wrong

Table 1: Narrative approaches towards risk


Not only do common approaches to research support the split between narrative and evidence-based thought, but it is also apparent that the balance between these two modes of processing events in the real world is not equal (Dahlstrom and Ho, 2012). Narrative text is recalled more easily and generates greater engagement as well as attitudes and belief change (Green and Brock, 2000; Slater and Rouner, 2002).  Many of these benefits are due to the cause and effect structure of the narrative which enables the audience to produce chronological sequences of events, stimulates thinking about what might happen and how the world works, thus limiting the number of future choices to what is made possible by the context of the narrative. Most importantly however such effects are often unconscious and implicit, accounting for much of the way in which we think, perceive and act towards events.  In the context of an educational project which is concerned with creativity of human thought in science and society, it is thus appear crucial to and plausible to look at science not only through the eye of evidence-based argumentation but mostly through recognition of the phenomenal interpretive power offered by narrative, and its associated elements of metaphors. 
In the remainder of this paper we will focus on the narrative features of science-society interactions. We will refer to the scientific imagination as being the narrative that is presented willingly or unwillingly as a dominant view of science in current times. 





Deconstructing the scientific imagination

As discussed earlier, one of the salient features of narratives is that of enabling projections about the future. With respect to techno-scientific innovations such focus is apparent: innovation is sought to ameliorate the human condition; to bring valuable goods; to devise the single best strategy which will solve important problems. So, the first grand narrative ‘of power’ is rooted in the image of the clever scientist as the ‘inventor of new entities’ committed to extend the opportunities for a better life for human beings, by controlling the forces of nature, minimise potential negative impacts and maximise positive gains: “Technology was transformed from a poetic ‘‘bringing forth’’ of things, dwellings, and gifts to a demanding expectation that ‘‘challenges’’ all of nature to yield calculable behaviours which suit human purposes” (Nordman, 2012, p. 44). Either by penetrating the world at sub-human and super-human scales or accessing the basic modes for the transmission of life across the Biosphere, the power of human agency is exerted as a constant exercise of creative, techno-scientific harnessing of the known and informed management of the unknown. For example, with regards to earlier examples drawn from the field of agri-technology, with the specific knowledge of the rate of growth of salmon in aquaculture ponds, selected and purposefully produced feeds can be administered to increase the number of crops and fuel social and economic growth. The risks associated with the depletion of natural resources due to the carnivorous diet of the salmon (Smith et al., 2008), or the impact of hormone-growth on human health (Swan et al., 2007) are considered ‘manageable risks’ within a narrative which frame science as a powerful solution to human problems. 

The power of techno-scientific innovation however can only be accepted if it promises to be safe. The narrative of power is thus served by an associated narrative of control which is often declined in terms of safety and the ability of scientists to contain the possible health and ecological impacts that may follow. Techno-scientific research gives great value to the possibility to quantify processes and phenomena in the natural world. The world described quantitatively is also predictable. When faced with lack of knowledge the steps taken consist of defining a finite and numerable set of discrete portions of the phenomenon that can be isolated and individually analysed, as a powerful strategy used to normalise the risk. Drawing on the controversy about the potential transgression of genetic barriers operated by GM organisms, a key image of the narrative of control is the notion of ‘barrier’ (Benessia and Barbiero, 2012): the world is not perceived as being interconnected; rather, portions of complexity are isolated and studied along identifiable ‘lines of separation’ that may be physical, genetic, environmental or normative and epistemological. Further examples of barriers are the techno-scientific responses of geo-engineering engaged in the development of solar shields to protect the Earth from climate change (Ref); carbon storage is another strategy to deflect the trajectory of carbon circulation global systems. Acting on the lines of separation is a strategy which enables to define the realm of disciplinary expertise that is deemed to be necessary for any project (Colucci-Gray et al. 2014); to map the realm of inquiry and finally, to make decisions about which knowledge and evidence are deemed to be included as being relevant and legitimate (Chalmers, 1997). In a large literature review looking at the opportunities and constraints for integration between western science and indigenous knowledge systems, Bohensky and Mary, 2011 however cast light on the opportunities provided by dialogue between knowledge in gaining a more nuanced understanding of ecological systems at different scales.   

Finally, the third grand narrative is that of urgency. As mentioned earlier, the global, socio-environmental problems affecting humanity at the current time are pressing. Techno-science is proposed as the large-scale fix, able to operate simultaneously in different locales. The narrative of urgency is future orientated, and it is rooted into the image of an impending catastrophe: lack of time and high stakes justify the solutions and support the investments if one wants to meet the challenges of climate change, food scarcity or the threat of a global war.  

The entirety of such events unravels at a time when global society is becoming conscious of the existence of limits within which human activity can develop; such limits are insurmountable. There are limits of resource availability (raw resources, drinking water, food) and there are limits to the Earth’s capacity to eliminate waste and recycle the products of human activities (from residues of manufacturing processes, to the chemicals contained in pesticides and fertilisers and which interfere with the quality of water and human and animal health). Awareness of such limits has consequences and impacts on political choices: what criteria need to be adopted to ensure that resources are equally distributed? How do we choose amongst the many available routes the solutions that meet the democratic and equality criteria upon which modern democratic states were founded? Such questions can be posed to any public initiative, scientific research included: in relation to the construction of new roads, funding for education, protection of cultural heritage etc. So creativity is also required not only for innovation but for asking important questions about models of living and relating to other people, living species and the world. 

And some counter-narratives: developing awareness of our relationship with the natural world
 
Many authors from fields as diverse as anthropology, philosophy and social studies of science are converging with insights into alternative ways of conceiving the role of humanity on the Earth. Drawing on the earlier works of Heidegger, Ladelle McWhorter (2009) suggests to give thought to the ‘strangeness’  of our technological being within the world. “His works resound with calls for human beings to grow more thoughtful, to take heed, to notice and reflect upon where we are and what we are doing, lest… be lost irretrievably in forces we do not understand and perhaps only imagine and pretend we can control” (p. 6). Heidegger’s work is call to reflect, to think in a different way, steering from the calculative, managerial and pragmatic fixes of techno-science.  Drawing on the 1953 essay “The question concerning technology”, McWorther draws attention to Heidegger’s insight into the dangers of our age. The danger is a kind of ‘forgetfulness’ which lead human beings to “the loss of what makes us the kind of beings we are, beings who can think and who can stand in thoughtful relationships to things” (p. 10). Of relevance to our discussion are Heidegger’s reflections on knowledge. A stark position is taken against ideas of knowledge conceived as accumulation of facts and truth about the world; rather, in Heideggarian terms, knowledge is a process rooted in the direct experience of the knower; it is dependent upon one’s own personal dispositions, context, methods and motivations to know. More importantly according to McWorther, it is the recognition that knowing something can only occur at the expenses and by virtue of not knowing something else. At a first level of interpretation, this idea of knowledge reinforces established notions of human limitations. Yet, Heidegger goes further to argue that knowing and not knowing are not simply mutually exclusive, thus leading to the false idea that eventually, given the time, the resources and more powerful tools, one will eventually be able to know everything. Rather, knowledge and ignorance are mutually interdependent. Such recognition implies that the unknown is an integral part of our experience for the way in which we approach reality sets us on a path which is visible to us only against the hazy background of other trajectories, which are necessary but not available to us. In this view, the idea of an encompassing form of knowledge, theory or even understanding of complex situations is a dream or an illusion. In order to approach the world in a manner exclusively technological, mathematical, scientific etc. we must have already given up or lost other approaches or modes of coming to know that would unfold into knowledge of some other sorts (McWorther, 2009). As reported by many commentators in relation to the non-use of the precautionary principles in policy-making around science and technology, the ideal of incontrovertible evidence and hard facts is still dominating policy decisions. Yet such ideal can only be upheld by exclusion of liminal forms of knowledge; by referral to the myth of the disinterested scientists pursuing truthful knowledge and a view of nature as a controllable and mechanical entity (Harding, 2003). Most interestingly, the insights provided by Heidegger lead to the idea that different ways of knowing and being exist by virtue of the inherent variability of our interactions with the world. 

These reflections on knowledge resonate strongly with notions of creativity and insights drawn from other disciplines, such anthropology and neurosciences. A link has been recognised between biological diversity and cultural and linguistic diversity (Maffi, 2001) suggesting that the knowledge we hold about a place cannot be disjointed from the ways we lead our lives in interaction with the natural systems. Contributions from the field of neuroscience recognised Cognition of the natural world evolves through interaction with the knowing subject. Ecosystem dynamics and human agency intertwine, according to the dialectic of an inalienable link between nature and culture (Rival, 1998).  Drawing on this understanding, it becomes apparent how cultural artefacts – from scientific tools, to stories, myths, and representations – contain important messages about the ways different societies have framed their relationship with the natural world. 
 
Cognitive, linguistic and cultural basis of creativity

The word ‘frame’ can be defined as a structured configuration of semantic roles that constitutes cultural or world knowledge. Worldviews are expressed collectively through cultural and artistic events, political decisions, laws, educational projects. At the individual level such visions are transmitted, as well as by actions, mainly through the language - the natural language but also the images and gestures that we use to communicate. Language is a way of being in the world, an instrument which enables us to conceive, organise and represent a view of reality and act according to that view. It is a system made of signifiers (words, symbols, images, etc.), interconnected elements that create links to exploit the mind’s potential for the construction of signifieds (meanings). This “meaning potential” emerges through our dialogue with the world (both surrounding and within us) and the people with whom we interact via the “social semiotic” of language (Halliday, 1978).

Perhaps one of the most significant and revolutionary understandings in the area of language is related to its origins – that is – at the point of biological exchanges between the internal environment and the external environment of the individual (Damasio, 2000).  Significant advancements in the field of human cognition have contributed to refine our understanding between the fundamental relationships that exist between the ways in which we interact with the world, our language and cognitive development, that is, the ways in which we see ourselves into the world. Indeed the founding principle of the cognitive sciences was that of a clear distinction between function and organ. Upon this premise, the brain was equated to a syntactic processor equivalent to a digital calculator or any other physical system that can be described in computational terms (Johnson-Laird, 1988). In recent years, there has been growing acknowledgement of cognitive processes as being embedded in brain anatomy and within an organism sensory motor experience (Clark, 1997; Varela, Thompson and Risch, 1991). Specifically embodied cognition means that “acting in the world, interacting with objects and individuals in it, representing, perceiving and categorising are merely different levels of the same relationship that exists between an organism and its environment (Adenzato and Garbarini, 2006). On such premises, the relationship between organism and environment becomes fundamental to learning, embedded as it is, within actions which shape the organism neuronal connectors, memory and the subject ‘s ability to anticipate the perception and construction of a certain phenomenon or object through a powerful ‘as if’ schema. This schema is not simply theoretical or abstract but interactive and pragmatic incorporated in an individual’s practical activities. As if means that as individuals we are able to synchronise our activities on the activities of other individuals and such actions become embedded in our neuronal circuits. Such memories affect the way in which we are able to recognise similar actions or patterns in other contexts, or to transfer prior knowledge to new experience by means of affinity or similarity. 

From the interactions between individuals and environment emerge the social and cultural artefacts we normally refer to when discussing creativity and namely, variety of forms of expression. These artefacts however cannot be reduced simply to the neuronal activity taking place in the brain and even less to the specific genes regulating the expression of neuronal faculties. Creative expression is something that results from the ongoing and recursive interactions of the brain with physical, social and cultural environments.  From an epistemological point of view, such understanding recognises that we cannot obtain access to knowledge from a completely independent, cognitive vantage point. The bodily interactions and the sensorial information which is sent to the brain are fundamental to brain plasticity, thus shaping the neuronal pathways and the information stored in the working memory: “to perceive an object, visually or otherwise, the organism requires both specialised sensory signals and signal from the adjustment of the body, which are necessary for perception to occur” (Damasio, 2000, p. 147).  This understanding points to the recognition that language is an expression of our existence as organisms embedded within the flows of energy, matter and information that pervade and regulate Life on Earth. Moreover, life itself is a generator of creativity by altering the way neurons connect with others. In relation to language, the peculiarities of our condition as living beings make it possible to realise that there are many ways in which an organism can relate and gain perceptions of the world as there are neurons and available experiences. Like any tool, language has its limits, these limits risk being the limits of the world we perceive (Wittgenstein 1974). 

Language conveys not only information, but ideas and visions. It contains elements of ambiguity and it continuously evolves. In the realm of science therefore, we come to a realisation that also scientific language is the expression of an experience, which is limited, albeit powerful. In an extended account of the use of metaphor in science, Brown (2003) articulates the idea of scientific concepts as products emerging from bodily perception elaborated through language. “We conceptualise and talk about abstract ideas in terms of more concrete ones. This is possible because we are able to map, i.e. identify a correspondence between, the elements of a concretely based concept and hose of a more abstract one” (p. 41). By virtue of such correspondence, it becomes clear that language is in continuity with experience and our conceptual thinking. Far from being pure semantic, a metaphor functions as a conceptual organiser affecting future thinking and future actions.   It is no surprise that in carrying out their activities, scientists use the same conceptual ideas that they encounter and apply in other aspects of everyday life (examples can include simpler metaphors such as ‘container’; ‘web’; or more complex ones: ‘the journey’; ‘the catalyst’. The loss of pretence of scientific certainty enables the different ways of seeing and perceiving ourselves in nature to come to surface, by means of an enhanced understanding of metaphor and poetry: “In that sense, we see them as metaphors, providing knowledge not by mere straightforward assertion, but rather by suggestion, implicit as well as explicit”(Ravetz, 2003, p. 68). And through the scientific language powerful – often implicit - messages are spread and disseminated, contributing to shape society’s new frames of the world.  

Engaging in creative dialogue across science, society and the environment. 

The awareness of the power and limits of language might promote the development of reflective thinking able to unveil implicit ideas and uncover the underlying imaginaries. Such an attitude would allow to make one’s own choices and to bear the responsibility of one’s adhesion and /or contribution to one of the frames that are driving our society, or to the creation of new frames. 

In the early nineties, Funtowicz and Ravetz elaborated the framework of post-normal science to describe a situation kin to current conditions in which “the complexity, irreversibility, and indeterminacy involved in contemporary socio-environmental issues are fully acknowledged in all their consequences” (Benessia an Barbiero, 2012, p. 78). The starting point of their reflection is the recognition that complex, socio-environmental issues are characterised by uncertain knowledge, antagonistic values and high stakes. Contrary to the classic model in which uncertainty is managed by means of narrowing the frame of analysis, controversial issues in science and society derive from the existence of different normative positions and disciplinary frames for it becomes necessary to involve an extended peer community in making decisions. The framework of post-normal science with its rainbow coloured tri-dimensional quadrants has acquired greater visibility in the social studies of science (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990). On a two-dimensional diagram, listing the levels of uncertainty and the levels of decision stakes, the framework describes three different kinds of scientific research and spheres of action: the first quadrant, applied science, refers to the conditions of laboratory science, in which risks are predictable and under control. When complexity grows, we come to the realm of professional consultancy. In this area risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis bringing evidence from different disciplinary experts are often invoked to seek out ways to reduce the margin of uncertainty and provide scientific recommendations. Finally, extending further the level of techno-scientific power we get into the paradoxical situation of post-normal science, whereby knowing more entails progressively higher levels of uncertainty, indeterminacy and ignorance. This is a context of dynamic reflexivity in which reductionist approaches are not only limited but they further alienate the knower from the complexity of what is to be known​[3]​. There is a need of developing new methods for knowledge production and new criteria for assessing their quality (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). In the realm of post-normal science, no single approach is sufficient but there is a need to involve a plurality of different and all legitimate perspectives engaged in dialogue. This model aligns itself well with the work of Sheila Jasanoff (2007) who proposed a rejection of the hubris of techno-science in favour of a narrative of humility.  Humility derives from an acknowledgement of complexity as an inherent dimension of our lives.  In these terms, a position of humility can encourage a greater appreciation of alternatives and thus bring up greater understanding of different courses of action. Arguably, it is plurality at a low power and precaution, which may hold the greater claim to sophistication (Stirling, 2008). 
   
Creative learning in the post-normal age
The perspective of post-normal science offers some pointers for re-thinking learning processes within a view of precaution and sustainability. It may be suggested that while precautionary approaches are being suggested as operational mechanisms for decision-making at policy level, it is important to reflect on the role that science education can play in preparing citizens to act as stakeholders in the extended process of knowledge production. How could the learning and teaching process in science lead to low-power and creative possibilities for life on the Earth?    
Educational systems worldwide are being reformed to adapt to rapid societal changes, due to global economic restructuring and technology development. Students need to be prepared for life in a world that we know very little, except that it will be characterized by substantial and rapid change, and is likely to be more complex and uncertain than today`s world (Hodson, 2003, in Kind and Kind, 2012). Appearance of creativity in a range of policy curricular documents worldwide e.g. in Scotland (Curriculum for Excellence), Finland (competitiveness, creativity and social justice as central curricular aims; Australian National Curriculum (Askew, 2013, Hargreaves, et al. 2007)
Creativity is no longer something that is unique or distinctive. It has now become a necessary and fundamental to the achievement of the person, organization or country. Creativity is not only subject to the invention only but covers all acts and thoughts (Daud et al, 2011). Bruner (1962) claimed that we must encourage the creativity of our children and students as preparation for the future, given that the future is more difficult tan ever before to define (in Runco, 2004). Some authors describe creativity as a central component of scientific thinking. Scientific activity is creative by definition but we continuously teach science as if creativity did not exist (Hahn). Designing investigations and interpreting data to come up with new explanations are, in themselves, tasks where imagination plays a fundamental role. Hadzigeorgiou et al (2012) mention the following:


	scientific theories are creative products (ideas) made by scientists;
	many scientists work on the same problems and new ideas emerge by common effort;
	all scientists must use their imagination when contributing to the development of science;
	in science creativity and rationality always work together. Scientific creativity never works without rationality and strict empirical testing. 

There is a view that any approach to scientific creativity in the context of school science should be both “authentic” in scientific research terms and meaningful and appropriate to the students` needs and abilities (Kind and Kind, 2007, in Hadzigeorgiou et al, 2012).
So what is creativity? By bringing together in a coherent synthesis research from cognitive psychology, philosophy, neurosciences, Pfenninger and Shubik (2001) contend that “creativity must be the ability to generate in one’s brain (the association cortex) novel contexts and representations that elicit associations with symbols and principles of order” (p. 235). Such symbols or images are part of the repertoire of acquired representations which populate one’s culture and society. Creativity further involves the ability to translate particular representations into a work of art or science. Such insights are fundamental to education and science education in particular. In the first instance, it becomes clear that cognition and emotions are directly connected in the processing of information and the making of decisions, rational or otherwise. Secondly, the collective societal or cultural repertoire of innate representations and acquired experiences becomes a fundamental reference point for all creative work (Pfenninger and Shubik, 2001).  
One of the most striking features of techno-science vis-à-vis society in the global era is its dynamic, transformative power. Knowledge is not separate from action. A first strep to gain awareness of impacts of such knowledge is to re-gain a personal and direct connection with the roots of such knowledge and the narrative it seeks to portray. Montuori (2012) refers to the development of phronetic knowledge that is, the ability to recognise actors, actions and places hidden by labels and products. An important aspect of this type of learning is the re-appropriation of one of the key aspects o creative thinking which is that of operating by the medium of ‘as if’. Through direct, bodily experiences in the natural and social world our brain builds a map of processes and events which are connected to feelings and emotions, and retained in the memory. By virtue of such a memory map we are able to recognise similar patterns of events when they occur, often by virtue of an initial sensation which brings related memories. By the same token however, a familiar feeling can give us an insight into unanticipated or unfamiliar events and make us act by trespassing realms of prior experience or knowledge. 
The implications for science learning are multi-fold and relate in the main to the possibility of re-connecting many disparate fields of science education via a creative approach. Some suggestions are given as follows:
-	Creativity, environment and well-being. The recognition of the continuity between body, environment and language is key to the recognition of the value of direct experiences in the environment. While outdoor experiences are increasingly recognised as being crucial to physical and mental health, more attention should be given to integrating such experiences within a broader agenda for science education. 
-	Language and scientific exploration. Understanding of the value of metaphor can be integrated within science education to develop a broader understanding of scientific literacy. Practical activities in science can be linked to creative approaches aiming to integrate imagination and knowledge through methodologies seeking active elaboration and creation of new products.
-	The value of linguistic reflection however can be incorporated within activities which promote awareness of different ways of approaching problems and thinking through agendas, rationales and methods for research.  
-	Dealing with controversial issues and conflict.  A critical awareness of the use of metaphor in science can enhance understanding of the role of science in controversial issues. Dialogue between different points of view can offer the arena for the formulation of new. Shared metaphors for equitable and sustainable life on the Earth. 
The different options indicated above imply increasing levels of complexity and creativity in addressing scientific content by framing science learning within broader levels of awareness of the interactions between science, society and the environment. It must be noted however that we do not intend to present them as a fixed hierarchy. The different levels offer a variety of different approaches which can be related and combined dynamically according to the teaching purposes and goals (Table 1).

Table 1: A model to present different approaches linking Science and Creativity
Scientific Issues (Action – What for? What if?)	Expanded – higher order thinking skills taking into account other knowledges, languages and perspectives.	Exploring different ways of knowing. Participatory processes, consensus, dealing with conflict. Creative scenarios. 
Science Inquiry (Process – How?)	Critical Inquiry skills. Narrow focus within science but “playful”, ownership and creativity.	Developing skills for knowing (testing ideas, methods, evaluating)Creative processes.
Science “Facts”/ Knowledge (Product – What?)	“Transmission”/ Memory/ Recall. Creativity as a vehicle.	Acquisition and presentation of knowledge. Creative products.
-	
Such suggestions critically interrogate current roles and practices of schools. As eloquently illustrated by Humes (2011) both creativity and learning are malleable terms which can be mobilised for different purposes, some benign and some less so. As illustrated earlier, creativity is a case in point of a concept which ahs been largely used to support a very particular view of economy and development: “In this sense the discourse is contested and students should be encouraged to reflect on the nature of he contestation” (p. 15). 

Conclusions: living with complexity and ignorance
There are many possible attitudes, individual and collective, towards complexity, uncertainty and more deeply, the unknown. The first attitude is to focus primarily on changing the outside world, by seeking to develop and maintain power and control over natural phenomena. 
The second is based on the preservation and refinement of the ability of human beings, and more generally of all living things, to react and adapt; it is based on supporting and improving our individual and collective resilience. 
The apparatus of contemporary techno-scientific innovation is highly contradictory and paradoxical in nature. While it has had some undeniable successes, it can be interpreted as a response that emerges from the first type of approach. In this scenario, the complexity is an obstacle that must be eliminated from the system, or at least simplified in terms of a negotiable set of complications. The uncertainty and fear of the unknown are translated into the assessment and management of risk (Jasanoff, 2012)
Conversely, other views start from the proposition that the complexity generated by our techno-science is such that we are not only unable to control it, but not even to understand it (Harris & Sarewitz, 2011). On the research front, both qualitative and quantitative approaches are useful, and both are insufficient. The style of the knowledge production process is dialectical, supported by an array of distinct perspectives and recognising that the achievement of a final truth is a misleading, vacuous goal. This conception might not appear to be new but it is only permitted at the very margins of the practice of science, such as in discussions with small groups of colleagues involved in open explorations. Otherwise, in public arenas, from the realm of popular science to education, certainty rules. However as noted by Ravetz (2003) in the face of events that cannot be controlled or even anticipated, the project of prediction is apparently falling under the pressure of real, inextricable uncertainty. The dilemma of embracing uncertainty without retracting to immobility can be seen creatively if we understand that the factual, predictive knowledge of science are telling us less about the future and more about the social and cultural aspirations of the present. 
The charm of scientific inquiry becomes even greater if one can move from specific questions, often comprehensible only to specialists, to more general questions, which are interesting for the public, and enable it to turn from a passive to an active subject involved in decision-making. 
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^3	  Kenneth Worthy elaborates on the notion of self-reflexivity as a prevalent and pregnant characteristic of our lives: “we are more involved with our own creations and less involved with the world beyond our stuff” (p. 90). Worthy introduces the discussion of ‘artifice’ to refer to all the devices that make up our man-created world (media TV; digital interfaces and so on) and with which we interact on a regular basis. The artifice moves nature further and further into the background, precluding the possibility for us to experience it directly anymore. This is for pragmatic reasons (we spend more and more time in the digital world that ever before); ecological reasons (demands of energy-hungry devices corresponds to increasing demands on nature); methodological reasons: our ways of knowing are limited to the possibilities offered by the device and they typically exclude the whole, sensorial body; epistemological reasons: “the artifice we generate and infuse in our lives is full of reductive characteristics” (Worthy, p. 90). Rectilinear forms and straight lines make up for much of our devices and the way we design and inhabit our social spaces (cities, houses, films etc.). Even the most sophisticated devices are unable to represent the variability, changeability and dynamism of the natural world. 
